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COVID-19	crisis	management	blurs	the	boundary
between	politics	and	technocracy
What	is	the	future	of	technocracy,	after	COVID-19,	asks	Jonathan	White	(LSE)?	Current	crisis	management	only
blurs	ever	more	the	boundary	between	politics	and	technical	expertise,	he	argues.	
“COVID-19	represents	a	new	form	of	economic	shock	that	cannot	be	tackled	using	the	textbooks	of	the	past.”	So
recently	observed	Christine	Lagarde,	head	of	the	European	Central	Bank	(ECB).	That	emergencies	throw
orthodoxies	in	the	air	seems	clear​;	fresh	problems	demand	fresh	thinking.	But	her	words	also	hint	at	how
technocrats	define	themselves	in	a	crisis.	As	much	as	these	are	the	conditions	in	which	expertise	is	challenged,
they	are	also	times	of	opportunity.	Officials	can	recast	themselves	as	practical,	flexible,	and	independent-minded​—
possessors	of	the	deeper	insight	that	lies	in	knowing	when	to	set	aside	yesterday’s	formulas.	Crisis	moments
encourage	the	transformation	of	technocracy,	and	with	it	the	relation	to	politics.
Twentieth-century	history	shows	how	turbulent	times	can	produce	calls	for	expert-led	government.	Movements	for
technocracy	emerged	in	1930s	America	and	Europe	in	response	to	the	Great	Depression,	taking	inspiration	from
the	rationalism	attributed	to	wartime	planning.	The	kind	of	expertise	they	prized	was	marked	by	the	experience	of
crisis.	Practical	in	spirit,	it	was	about	knowing	what	works,	and	how	to	fix	things	when	they	break.	Many	consciously
celebrated	the	figure	of	the	engineer.	The	writings	of	Thorstein	Veblen,	Howard	Scott,	and	Walter	Rautenstrauch	in
the	United	States	likened	society	to	a	machine,	calling	for	government	as	“social	engineering.”
More	soberly	and	influentially,	the	engineer’s	outlook	was	present	in	Keynesian	economics,	emerging	with
the	General	Theory	in	1936	as	the	basis	of	postwar	technocracy.	Formed	in	the	encounter	with	mass
unemployment,	this	was	macroeconomics	as	problem	solving.	In	a	world	assumed	to	be	volatile	and	swayed	by	the
“animal	spirits,”	markets	never	quite	worked	as	they	should.	The	policymaker’s	role	was	to	tinker	and	probe,	to	keep
things	working	despite	stresses,	strains,	and	shocks.	Confronted	with	a	complex	and	changing	reality,	discretion
and	judgement	were	needed,	along	with	the	prudence	to	build	in	spare	capacity	for	the	unexpected.
As	the	Keynesian	consensus	passed	with	the	energy	crises	of	the	1970s,	a	new	vision	of	technocracy	emerged,
based	instead	on	the	ideal	of	the	scientist.	For	monetarists	like	Milton	Friedman,	previous	orthodoxy	rested	on
dubious	propositions	that	needed	rigorous	testing:	the	economist-engineers	had	taken	too	much	for	granted.	More
than	earlier	liberals	like	Friedrich	Hayek	(himself	a	critic	of	“scientism”),	neoliberals	developed	their	ideas	on	the
model	of	physics.	Assuming	a	basic	stability	in	how	the	world	works​—how	markets	operate,	why	firms	behave	as
they	do​—the	economist-scientist	was	to	seek	general	laws	of	causality,	while	technocracy	was	to	use	standard
templates	rather	than	personal	judgement	and	discretion.	Both	would	be	a	kind	of	anonymous	process,	politically
invisible	and	independent.	Central	banking	would	be	based,	ideally,	on	fixed	rules	and	delegated	objectives	(e.g.
low	inflation),	while	the	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	and	World	Bank	would	develop	a	Washington
Consensus	of	standardised	policies,	for	which	post-communist	societies	were	a	convenient	laboratory.	There	was	a
utopian	current	in	this	model	of	technocracy:	rather	than	manage	an	imperfect	order,	the	goal	was	the	optimal
arrangement.
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But	what	about	when	things	go	wrong?	Technocracy-as-science	suits	stable	times,	when	the	real	world	can
passably	resemble	the	laboratory.	Emergencies	disrupt	this	norm,	since	actions	must	be	taken	quickly,	before	all
the	evidence	is	in.	When	the	Asian	financial	crisis	hit	in	1997,	a	different	expertise	seemed	called	for​—know-how
more	than	know-that,	plus	knowing	what	not	to	do.	Enter	the	figure	of	the	doctor,	and	a	tendency	to	liken	the	newly
globalized	and	financialized	economy	to	an	organism	struck	by	pathogens.	Faced	with	“Asian	flu,”	the	role	of	IMF
policymakers	was	to	tackle	contagion.	On	the	model	of	disease	control,	this	approach	recognized	the	reality	of
degenerative	tendencies,	while	implying	most	were	external	to	policy	itself	and	not	something	for	which	officials
were	responsible.	It	also	managed	expectations.	The	doctor	assumes	change	and	decay.	There	was	now	no	such
thing	as	a	perfect	market	order:	sickness	was	always	possible	(implying,	of	course,	that	the	system	was	healthy
much	of	the	time).	In	this	increasingly	uncertain	world,	the	policymaker	was	licensed	to	make	discretionary
interventions	and	acquired	the	added	role	of	offering	“reassurance”	to	keep	anxieties	in	check.
In	the	economic	crises	of	the	2010s,	and	now	most	recently	with	COVID-19,	problem	solving	is	more	than	ever	the
name	of	the	game.	A	doctor’s	judgment	lies	in	connecting	case	to	known	remedy,	but	this	gets	harder	the	more
unfamiliar	the	disease.	Today’s	economic	technocracy	is	about	using	all	tools	in	the	toolkit​—in	that	sense	we	are
witnessing	the	return	of	the	engineer.	Decision-makers	emphasise	the	need	for	ingenuity,	discretion,	and	invention,
from	Mario	Draghi’s	“whatever	it	takes	to	preserve	the	euro”	to	Lagarde’s	“everything	necessary.”	Eurozone	policy
rules	are	re-described	as	“self-imposed	limits,”	revisable	to	preserve	deeper	goals	of	stability.	Nobel	Prize-winning
economists	ask	us	to	think	of	their	discipline	as	“plumbing”—engineering	at	the	sharp	end	where	things	can	get
messy.	There	is	even	a	note	of	the	theatrical	in	today’s	technocracy:	like	a	good	stage	performer,	Lagarde	keeps
suspense	about	measures	to	come,	“because	the	impact	will	also	be	linked	to	the	element	of	surprise.”
If	economic	technocracy	after	COVID-19	continues	to	move	in	this	direction,	there	are	some	reasons	to	be
optimistic.	After	decades	of	an	outlook	based	on	general	propositions	about	how	markets	supposedly	function,	a
perspective	more	conscious	of	market	failure—and	sometimes	the	need	to	slow	down	the	machine—sounds
attractive.	Whereas	scientific	expertise	can	be	excessively	specialized,	here	there	is	the	promise	of	a	more	rounded
perspective.	Greater	sensitivity	to	the	particularities	of	implementation	offers	a	vantage	point	from	which	to	accept
crosscutting	claims	to	social	justice.	And	when	it	is	recognized	that	the	system	is	only	as	good	as	the	policies
designed	into	it,	accountability	has	a	better	foundation.	While	similar	things	might	have	been	said	a	decade	ago,	the
effects	of	COVID-19	may	be	more	profound	than	those	of	2008,	occurring	as	they	do	against	the	backdrop	of	an
existing	crisis	of	Western	capitalism.
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But	there	are	also	notable	grounds	for	caution.	There	is	no	reason	to	suppose	crisis	technocracy	will	serve	left-
wing,	even	Keynesian,	objectives​:	a	willingness	to	intervene	in	the	face	of	shocks	can	serve	any	number	of	ends.
Moreover,	crisis	management	only	blurs	ever	more	the	boundary	between	technocracy	and	politics.	As	personal
discretion	comes	to	the	fore,	the	notion	that	technocrats	are	just	enacting	a	set	of	delegated	tasks	becomes
untenable​—their	power	is	more	elastic.	One	might	even	question	how	much	expertise	is	actually	present.	Scientific
knowledge	is	anchored	in	replicable	methods,	but	know-how	is	harder	to	objectify.	More	personalized	and	intuitive,
invoked	when	things	are	already	going	wrong,	it	can	be	hard	to	distinguish	from	arbitrary	rule.	How	do	we	know
who	has	it?	Should	this	authority	not	be	contested?
When	officials	distance	themselves	from	“the	textbooks	of	the	past,”	they	redefine	their	expertise	and	embrace	the
flexibility	sought	in	extreme	conditions.	Crisis	decisions	may	be	better	for	it.	But	as	technocrats	go	down	this	path,
one	may	question	whether	technocracy	remains	the	right	standard	to	apply.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	COVID-19	blog,	nor	LSE.	It	first	appeared	on	the
Boston	Review.
Jonathan	White	(@jonathanpjwhite)	is	Professor	of	Politics	at	the	LSE.	His	latest	book	is	Politics	of	Last	Resort:
Governing	by	Emergency	in	the	European	Union.
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